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a Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of California, San Francisco
Correspondence: Charlene Harrington, PhD, University of California, San Francisco, Laurel Heights Campus, Box 0612, San Francisco, CA 94143-0612. E-mail: chas{at}itsa.ucsf.edu.
Decision Editor: Laurence G. Branch, PhD
| Abstract |
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Key Words: Medicaid Home and community based services Waivers
The Medicaid home and community based services (HCBS) waiver program was established by Congress in 1981 under Section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act to shift services to the community and away from institutional settings (
Miller 1992
;
Miller, Ramsland, and Harrington 1999a
). By 1997, all states, except Arizona and the District of Columbia, had one or more 1915(c) HCBS waiver programs for long-term-care services (see Appendix, Note 1). By 1997, 228 different waiver applications had been submitted to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA;
Miller et al. 1999a
;
Salo 1998
).
The importance of the home and community based services increased with the passage of the
Americans With Disabilities Act 1990
, because it outlawed certain practices of private and public entities that unreasonably restrained the participation of individuals with disabilities in society. More recently, the Supreme Court ruled in Olmstead v. L. C. (1999) that states may not discriminate against persons with disabilities by refusing to provide community services when these are available and appropriate.
The Medicaid HCBS waiver program has grown from $3.8 million for 6 waivers in 1982 (
Miller 1992
;
Greenberg, Schmitz, and Lakin 1983
) to $8.1 billion in 1997 (
Burwell 1999
;
Miller et al. 1999a
). The program expenditures increased by 45% between 1996 and 1997 and by 12% between 1997 and 1998 (
Burwell 1999
;
Miller et al. 1999a
). Even with its growth, total HCBS waiver expenditures were only 15% of the $59 billion reported in total long-term-care Medicaid dollars in 1998, most of which was spent on institutional care (
Burwell 1999
). State Medicaid programs may offer home health and personal care services in addition to the HCBS waiver program. When Medicaid HCBS waivers, home health, and personal care services are combined, they represent 25% of total long-term-care service expenditures in the United States (
Burwell 1999
). The HCBS waiver program expenditures are less than institutional expenditures, in part, because of statutory and regulatory requirements imposed on the program to control costs (this point is discussed later). The HCBS waiver program also does not cover room and board expenses, although such expenses are paid in institutional settings. HCBS are optional services requiring state program funds. The spending patterns have varied dramatically by state depending on a wide number of factors (
Miller, Ramsland, and Harrington 1999b
).
The purpose of this article is to present first-time trend data on the state HCBS waiver participants collected by the investigators from the states (on HCFA Form 372). The data include the number and types of 1915(c) HCBS waiver programs actually operated by the states and the number of participants and expenditures from 1992 to 1997. In addition, the study examines an array of state-level factors associated with the number of state participants and expenditures in the 1992 to 1997 period. The analytical model tests the effects of sociodemographic, economic, political, public policy, and health service factors on waiver participants and expenditures. The identification of state- level variables associated with the development of waiver programs is important to the development of effective waiver policies. The information should inform policy makers and clinicians about which factors could be changed to expand the number of state waiver participants and/or expenditures.
| Background |
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The HCBS waiver program may be either statewide or confined to specific geographic areas (Section 1902 [a][1];
Gurny, Hirsch, and Gondek 1992
). A recent survey of state HCBS waiver programs found that 12 states out of 51 (including Washington, DC) had some waivers that were not statewide in 1999 (
LeBlanc, Tonner, and Harrington 2000
; see also Lipson & Laudicina, 1991). States have the option of applying the financial eligibility criteria that they use for institutions (hospitals, nursing facilities [NFs], or intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded [ICF-MRs]) for up to 300% of the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) for individuals living in the community who are in the HCBS waiver program (
Hovarth 1997
). Fourteen states have income standards for institutional eligibility set at levels below 300% of SSI (
LeBlanc et al. 2000
). The HCBS programs may also use the spousal improverishment standards for institutional services. In 1999,
LeBlanc and colleagues 2000
found that 7 out of 49 states (excluding Arizona and Washington, DC) did not use the same special income criteria for HCBS as for institutional services.
Under the statute and regulations, the HCBS program is limited to those who would otherwise require the level of care provided in institutions including hospitals, NFs or ICF-MRs. Although HCBS waiver participants must be eligible for institutional care, the states have wide flexibility to establish need criteria for the waivers that are the same criteria as the state's criteria for institutional care (
Harrington, LaPlante, et al. 2000
;
O'Keeffe 1996
). Consequently, the need criteria vary widely for the waivers within and across states.
Under the HCBS waivers, states may target the 1915(c) waiver program to particular groups specified under each state's waiver plan; they are not required to offer services to all categorically or medically needy groups. (This is called a waiver of comparability; Section 1915[c][4][A]; 42 U.S.C. 1396n). States may provide waiver services up to the maximum number of HCFA-approved waiver slots or openings. When the state waiver slots are full, states may then establish waiting lists for program services or states may request additional waiver slots from HCFA as long as the state has funding for the waiver program. HCFA's legal counsel has stated that states are allowed to give priority to Medicaid participants within target groups as long as the criteria are not arbitrary and are clear and specified in the waiver application (
O'Keeffe 1996
).
The shortage of HCBS waiver programs for the Medicaid population is a problem found across the states.
Kassner and Williams 1997
reported that 33 states had waiting lists in 1996 for individuals who were Medicaid eligible and wanted to be in the Medicaid HCBS waiver program but the program services were limited.
O'Keeffe 1996
also reported states had waiting lists because of inadequate funding or too few waiver slots. Massachusetts made a major shift from institutional to community care for both the mentally retarded and developmentally disabled (MR/DD) and the mentally ill groups between 1990 and 1996, but the state had almost 1,400 people residing in nursing homes and on waiting lists for community-based residential and day care (
Holahan, Bovbjerg, Evans, Wiener, and Flanagan 1997
). A study in Texas also reported 30,000 people on the combined waiting lists for community-based MR/DD and mental health services (
Wiener, Evans, Kuntz, and Sulvetta 1997
). Another survey of state Medicaid officials in 19981999 found that 27 states had waiting lists for HCBS waiver services, although some states could only estimate the numbers, and 42 states reported inadequate numbers of HCBS waiver slots (
Harrington, LeBlanc, Wood, Satten, and Tonner 2000
). The different procedures used by states to collect data and screen individuals can affect the size of the waiting lists. According to state officials, the waiting lists generally reflected a lack of state funding for the HCBS waiver program to match federal Medicaid dollars (
Harrington, LeBlanc, et al. 2000
). Other analyses have suggested that waiver availability is related to the overall resources of states (
Miller et al. 1999b
).
| Factors Associated With State Waivers |
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Higher percentages of women in the labor force (who would be unavailable to care for elderly and disabled family members) should increase the demand for long-term-care services (
Silverman 1990
;
Kemper 1992
;
Houde 1998
).
Nyman, Sen, Chan, and Commins 1991
and
Kenny 1993
found that urban residents were more likely to use home health services than rural residents. Thus, we expected that states with a higher percentage of the population living in metropolitan areas should increase demand and be positively associated with waiver participants and expenditures.
Although African Americans are more likely to require assistance for limitations in daily living (
Harpine, McNeil, and Lamas 1990
),
Kemper 1992
found that African Americans and Hispanics were less likely to receive formal home health services. Although the findings are mixed, other studies have found less access to long-term-care services in minority populations (
Cagney and Agree 1999
;
Wallace, Levy-Storms, Kington, and Andersen 1998
;
Houde 1998
;
Murtaugh, Kemper, and Sillman 1990
). States with large non-White populations may have fewer waiver participants and expenditures.
Economic factors can of course affect the demand for waiver services as well as the input prices and labor availability of waiver providers. States with higher personal income per capita are expected to have a higher demand for long-term care, but these states may also be more generous in their funding of Medicaid waiver programs (
Buchanan, Cappellini, and Ohsfeldt 1991
;
Schneider 1993
;
Kane, Kane, Ladd, and Nielson 1998
;
Miller et al. 1999b
). States with high poverty may have increased demand for services if individuals are unable to pay for long-term care. On the other hand, high poverty rates may lower the demand for waiver services because more individuals may be unemployed and thus available to provide informal care services to family and friends.
Political factors should have some direct effects on the amount of waiver participants and expenditures. Those state politicians with conservative voting records generally have been considered to be less likely to support Medicaid programs, whereas liberals traditionally have supported funding for public programs. (See the approach of
Barrilleaux and Miller 1988
;
Lanning, Morrisey, and Ohsfeldt 1991
). The role of the governor is important in shaping state policies (
Schneider 1993
;
Schneider and Jacoby 1996
). Democratic governors may be more politically liberal and more likely to support Medicaid home and community based waiver programs. Finally, the aging lobby is expected to vary across states in terms of its political power. The percentage of membership in the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) is used as a proxy measure for the political power of the aging population in a state. These factors were developed by
Lanning and colleagues 1991
in his study of hospital regulation.
Waiver participants and expenditures may be positively related to the use of certificate of need (CON) and/or moratorium regulation of nursing homes. Where nursing home beds are controlled, there may be fewer nursing home participants and expenditures, and consequently more state funds may be available for HCBS waiver services (
Harrington, Swan, Nyman, and Carrillo 1997
). Where states use CON and/or moratorium for home health, the supply of waiver services may be diminished. State reimbursement rate policies may also influence state long-term-care programs (
Swan, Harrington, Grant, Luehrs, and Preston 1993
). Where state Medicaid reimbursement rates for nursing homes are high, states may have less funds available to pay for waiver participants and expenditures. On the other hand, where states have more generous reimbursement rates for home health care services (i.e., use Medicare methodologies), these states may have a higher supply of waiver providers and more waiver participants and expenditures.
State Medicaid eligibility policies should also have a direct effect on Medicaid waiver participants and expenditures. Those states that use more restrictive eligibility policies, such as the special 209(b) eligibility rules that limit the number of aged, blind, and disabled who are eligible for Medicaid, may reduce access to HCBS waiver participants and consequently reduce expenditures (
Miller et al. 1999b
). Those states with more generous eligibility in terms of the dollar threshold for the medically needy program, compared with those that have no medically needy spend down program or have low threshold levels, may consequently have higher waiver participants and expenditures.
The supply of health care services in a state can also directly influence waiver participants and expenditures. Greater numbers of nursing home beds per population should reduce the available funds for state waiver participants and expenditures (
Miller et al. 1999b
). Larger numbers of residential care beds and certified home health care agencies should have a positive influence on the number of waiver participants and expenditures. Increased rates of Medicare home health users per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries should also increase the demand for all long-term care, including the HCBS waiver participants and expenditures (
Harrington et al. 1997
;
Swan and Harrington 1990
;
Kenny, Rajan, and Soscia 1996
). More home health services in an area may lead to the identification of more individuals in need of HCBS services or it may be a proxy for higher disabilities rates in an area. Thus, these factors will be taken into account in the analytical model for the present study.
| Analytical Model |
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The waiver participants and expenditures were grouped together for the dependent variables across different types of waivers. Although the waivers involve many different target groups, some of the waivers had very few participants, were not operational for the entire study period, and were not available in all states. Thus, it would not be feasible to conduct an analysis of each waiver type separately. Moreover, the factors that affect the development of waivers for one target group within and across states are conceptually likely to affect the waivers for other target groups. For example, all target groups use nursing homes, residential care, and home care. Moreover, the sociodemographic, political, and economic factors were expected to have similar effects on waivers for different target populations. Although the waivers for the developmentally disabled and mentally retarded might be expected to be somewhat different from the aged and disabled, when we tested this group separately, the regression model results were very similar to the results for the total waiver groups as a whole.
The study used an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model with a random effects panel analysis. This allows a test of the effects of the independent variables across states, rather than one using only a fixed effects model that would test differences within states. We were interested in which factors across states contribute to the number of waiver participants and expenditures. A Hausman test of the parameter estimates of the two models showed that the random effects model was consistent and efficient and that use of the random effects model was appropriate (see
Hausman 1978
;
Greene 1990
).
The waiver participants and expenditures were standardized by 1,000 population rather than by total Medicaid recipients to allow for comparisons across state populations. This allowed us to test for the effect of state Medicaid financial eligibility criteria as an independent variable.
The independent variables were tested for multicollinearity by completing an SAS correlation matrix. None of the variables was found to be highly correlated (above a .65 correlation). In addition, tolerance tests in the regression analyses did not show multicollinearity to be a problem. The LIMDEP program Version 7.0 was used to conduct the regression analyses, using the adjustment for autocorrelation (
Greene 1991
).
Arizona and Washington, DC, were eliminated from the data set because they had no Medicaid waiver program in place during the 19921997 period. Thus, 49 states were included with 294 observations over a 6-year period. The significance test for the model was a 2-tailed test. The following equations were examined:
Waiver Participants per 1,000 Population = a +
Sociodemographicsit-1 + Economicit-1 +
Politicialit-1 + Public Policiesit-1 +
Health Care Servicesit-1 + Eit-1 (1)
Log Waiver Expenditures per 1,000 Population =
a + Sociodemographicsit-1 + Economicit-1 +
Politicalit-1 + Public Policiesit-1 +
Health Care Servicesit-1 + Eit-1, (2)
where Eit = random error terms.
The waiver participants showed a normal distribution, but the waiver expenditures were skewed, so the log of waiver expenditures was used as the dependent variable, adjusted for annual increases in the consumer price index. The analytical models are reduced-form equations that include factors influencing both the demand and the supply of HCBS waiver services that impact both the participants and the expenditures in the states. We examined the plots of the residuals from the two regression equations and found that the pattern of error terms was almost evenly distributed within the band of plus or minus 2.5, showing that the estimates were not biased.
| Data Sources for the Independent Variables |
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Political Party Variables.
Political party data for state governors were obtained from the
Republican Governors Association 1999
. The liberal rating compiled by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA; 1999) was used to determine the scores for each U.S. Senator from each state, which were averaged together. The ADA measures are based on votes on a wide range of legislative issues. The membership in the American Association of Retired Persons (1997) came from their organization.
Economic Factors.
The state income per 1,000 population came from the state personal income surveys by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis in the Department of Commerce (USDOC; 19911996). The poverty rates came from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (19911997).
State Policies.
The state reimbursement rates and methodologies for nursing facilities and for home health care were obtained from telephone surveys of state officials (
Harrington, Swan, Wellin, Clemena, and Carrillo 2000b
). State policies on certificate of need and moratorium for nursing homes and for home health were also obtained from telephone surveys of state officials (
Harrington, Swan, et al. 2000b
). The state eligibility policies and the eligibility threshold for the medically needy were collected from the U.S. Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA; 19911996a).
Health Care Services.
The numbers of nursing home and residential care beds and the number of certified home health agencies were obtained from primary data collected from state officials (
Harrington, Swan, Wellin, Clemena, and Carrillo 2000a
). The number of Medicare home health users were obtained from secondary HCFA Medicare data (
U.S. Health Care Financing Administration 1991
1996b). These data were standardized for each 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries in a state.
| Data Sources and Data Collection of the Dependent Variables |
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Lists of state HCBS waivers were obtained from the HCFA waiver application lists (
Salo 1998
). This study built on our initial effort in 1994 to collect Form 372 from the states for the year 1992. Between 1997 and 1999, we called all state Medicaid programs by telephone and sent faxes to collect HCBS waiver data for the study period. There was an average of 4 waivers per state for each year, so the data collection to reconstruct historical files from the states required a great effort. Overall, between 35 calls were made by study researchers to each state each year to collect the data for 19921997 period. The investigators were reasonably confident that all waivers had been identified and data either collected or estimated. Thus, the HCBS waiver data presented here represent the best available reports for the waiver information as well as the most recent complete data set of actual participants and expenditures.
Once the HCFA Form 372 reports were obtained, the data were coded and entered into a SAS database. States were asked to estimate data when the Form 372s were unavailable. The project collected data on a total of 155 waivers in 1992, which increased to 211 waivers in 1997. Data were obtained for a cumulative total of 1,111 waivers over the 6-year period. Of this total, 23% of total waivers only had initial reports available. Six percent of the total were estimated by states. Where states did not provide estimates, missing data for participants and expenditures (12% of the total) were estimated by the investigators. Because the data set was made up of cross-sectional time series data, linear interpolation was used to develop the estimates based on the other values provided by the states for the 6-year period.
| Results |
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The top five states in HCBS waiver participants per capita were Oregon (7.91 per 1,000 population), Kansas (5.92 per 1,000 population), Rhode Island (5.79 per 1,000 population), Missouri (4.41 per 1,000), and Vermont (3.84 per 1,000 population; see Table 2 ). The lowest five states in HCBS waiver participants per capita in the nation were Indiana, Louisiana, Tennessee, Maryland, and Mississippi.
Growth in Expenditures by State in 19921997 and Expenditures Per Capita
Table 3 shows that total 1915(c) waiver expenditures increased from $2.17 billion in 1992 to $7.87 billion in 1997, or by 263% over the 6-year period. The states with the highest percentage increases were Alaska, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, and Texas. Three of these states (Iowa, Louisiana, and Texas) had expenditures per capita below the national average. The lowest growth rates in expenditures were in North Dakota (62%), New Jersey (63%), Hawaii (77%), New Hampshire (83%), and Oregon (93%). All of these states except Hawaii had expenditures per capita above the national average. When the growth rate in waiver expenditures was adjusted for the consumer price index, the total growth was 218% between 1992 and 1997 (no table shown).
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Expenditures Per Participant
The U.S. average HCBS waiver expenditures per participant was $14,016 in 1997, and varied widely across states from $4,156 in Arkansas to $39,226 in Maryland in 1997 (no table shown). The highest waiver expenditures per participant were in Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, New Hampshire, and Maine. The lowest were in Arkansas, Mississippi, Kentucky, Nevada, Georgia, Ohio, Florida, and Illinois, which all spent less than $7,000 per participant.
Factors Associated With Waiver Participants in the States
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4 for the independent variables used in the analysis. Separate regression models are shown for the two dependent variables: waiver participants per 1,000 population and waiver expenditures per 1,000 population (log).
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The number of nursing home beds per 1,000 population in states was a strong negative predictor of the waiver participants. Increasing the bed supply by 100 beds per 1,000 population decreased the number of waiver participants by 22 participants. In contrast, the number of residential care beds per 1,000 population was a positive predictor. An increase of 100 residential care beds per 1,000 population increased the number of waiver participants by 16. The number of Medicare home health users per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries in states was also a positive predictor of the waiver participants. For every additional 1,000 Medicare home health users in a state, the number of waiver participants increased by 12.
Overall, the state effects alone predicted 81% of the variance, and the independent variables predicted 30% of the variance. The combined state and independent variables in the model predicted 90% of the variance.
Factors Associated With State Waiver Expenditures Per Population
Table 5 shows the factors associated with 1915(c) waivers in the state in the 1992 to 1997 time period. None of the sociodemographic factors were predictors of the amount of waiver expenditures. Of the political factors, having a democratic governor was a positive predictor of the amount of waiver expenditures. Personal income per 1,000 population was a positive predictor of the amount of expenditures. An increase of $100 in personal income per 1,000 population increased waiver expenditures by 14.5%.
In terms of public policies, using the Medicare home health reimbursement methodology increased the waiver expenditure rate. The dollar level of the eligibility thresholds for the medically needy was a positive predictor of the amount of state expenditures for waivers. For every $100 increase in the eligibility threshold, the waiver expenditures per 1,000 population in a state increased by 0.2%.
Nursing home beds per 1,000 population were negative factors on waiver expenditures as well as on waiver participants. An increase in 100 beds per 1,000 population decreased waiver expenditures by 16%. An increase in certified home health care agencies per population was also a strong predictor of the amount of waiver expenditures. An increase in one home health agency per 1,000 population increased waiver expenditures per 1,000 population by 14%. The Medicare home health users per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries was a positive predictor of the amount of state waiver expenditures. An increase in Medicare home health users by 100 increased the HCBS expenditures by almost 1%.
The independent variables predicted 37% of the variation across states. The state effects alone predicted 60% of the variance, with a combined effect of 72% of the variance explained by the random effects panel model.
| Summary and Discussion |
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Although previous studies have examined factors related to spending on home and community based services, this is the first study that has examined the factors associated with waiver participants in states. State variation in waiver participants and expenditures is related to a number of factors. As expected, the percentage of state population of persons aged 85 and over was a positive predictor of the number of waiver participants, responding to the great demand for services by the oldest old. Other sociodemographics and political factors did not predict waiver participation in states, but states with democratic governors were more likely to have higher waiver expenditures per population.
As expected, states with higher personal incomes had more waiver participants. This is probably because these states have more resources to pay for long-term-care services. This suggests that perhaps one policy approach to increase HCBS services is to increase the federal financial participation (FFP) rates (over the current levels) to states with low incomes as a means of encouraging these states to increase state waiver expenditures. Such a policy would require a statutory change in the Medicaid FFP rates. Another approach would be to offer special grants to low income states to help expand the number of participants and/or to build their HCBS waiver programs.
The findings suggest that states that used a certificate of need or moratorium on home health care agencies had lower numbers of waiver participants, probably because such policies restrict the supply of home care services. States that used Medicare home health reimbursement methods for the Medicaid program were associated with higher waiver expenditure levels. Medicare reimbursement methods are generally more generous that Medicaid rates (
Buchanan et al. 1991
). Medicare home health payment methods, however, did not translate into higher waiver participation rates.
Perhaps, the medically needy income criteria did not increase the number of waiver participants when controlling for other factors because most states had limits on their waiver slots and waiting lists for services (
Harrington, LeBlanc, et al. 2000
). Increasing the Medicaid eligibility criteria for the medically needy did increase Medicaid waiver expenditures, because more individuals are allowed to spend down and receive waiver services. If state medically needy financial criteria were made more generous, more individuals would also be able to spend down to become eligible for institutional services. If given a choice, however, more individuals may choose the waiver services over institutional services if the waiver services were readily available.
As expected, health care service availability did have an impact on waiver participation and expenditures. The number of nursing home beds per 1,000 population in states was a strong negative predictor of both waiver participants and expenditure levels. High ratios of nursing home beds per population increases access to institutional services and consequently increases Medicaid costs (
Harrington et al. 1997
). If states want to expand access to waiver programs, one approach would be to reduce the ratio of nursing home beds per population. Many states have fairly low nursing home occupancy rates (84% average occupancy in 1998) and these have declined steadily from 88% in 1992 (
Harrington, Carrillo, Thollaug, Summers, and Wellin 2000
). The number of nursing home beds per 1,000 aged population has also declined over the period. Thus, state reductions in nursing home beds would not appear to compromise access and may allow state policy makers to direct more funds to the waiver program. On the other hand, lowering the number of nursing home beds may be a difficult task to accomplish because of the political influence of the nursing home industry who would support increased Medicaid funds for institutional care rather than for HCBS services.
Interestingly, this study did not find that having a CON/moratorium for nursing homes had an impact on waiver participants or expenditures, when the model controlled for nursing home beds per population. This lack of association may be due to the delayed influence of CON/moratorium legislation, because CON/moratorium policies for nursing homes can only prevent future growth (
Harrington et al. 1997
). Perhaps CON/moratorium controls are best combined with other policies such as increasing the supply of residential care and home care services.
The number of residential care beds per 1,000 population was a positive predictor of waiver participation in states but not of waiver expenditures. This suggests that if states want to expand their waiver programs, one approach is to expand residential care beds per population as substitutes for nursing home beds. This may lower Medicaid costs, because residential care programs generally are less expensive than nursing home programs.
The expansion of home health agencies did not increase the number of waiver participants by a significant level but did increase the amount of waiver expenditures. It may be that states using independent home health care providers, rather than agency providers, are able to expand participation without increasing expenditures. This would be an important hypothesis to test in the future.
As expected, the number of Medicare home health users per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries in states was also a positive predictor of the number of state waiver participants and the amount of expenditures. Perhaps, higher home health utilization indicates that the population has higher disability rates. Or perhaps high Medicare home health utilization is associated with more individuals needing long-term HCBS care or results in the identification of more individuals who need long-term-care services beyond those offered by Medicare. State policy makers probably have little influence over Medicare home health policies.
The 1915(c) Medicaid waiver program has proved its importance in providing long-term-care to individuals with severe disabilities and chronic illness since its inception in 1981. The program is a particularly popular and sought-after Medicaid program among those with disabilities, because it is a way to prevent institutionalization and to offer choice of long-term-care setting. Disability advocates have lobbied for the passage of legislation, such as the Medicaid Community Attendant Services and Supports Act of 1999, that would provide personal care in the home as an alternative to institutional care. Moreover, the Supreme Court decision in the Olmstead v. L.C. (1999) suggests that states must begin to address how to ensure that individuals have the option to remain in the community rather than in institutional care.
The data from this study show that states have been able to keep the average Medicaid waiver costs ($14,016) well below the average Medicaid institutional costs for long-term care. The average institutional cost per recipient for SNF and ICF-MR services combined were $23,225 in 1997 (
Harrington, Swan, et al. 2000a
). Institutional costs, of course, cover room and board expenses, but HCBS waiver services are not allowed to pay for such expenses. This issue is important because states must demonstrate that each waiver is no more costly than institutional care (cost neutral), and the states must ensure that every waiver participant meets the need criteria for institutional care. Thus, waivers are required by Medicaid statute to be direct substitutes for institutional care.
The lower waiver costs per participant than institutional costs are consistent with reports that have suggested that the HCBS waiver program has the potential for being cost effective. A 1996 study of Washington, Oregon, and Colorado concluded that the expansion of home and community-based services was cost effective in these states (
Alecxih, Lutzky, and Corea 1996
). A 1994 study had similar conclusions about HCBS in Washington, Oregon, and Wisconsin when coupled with decreased institutional capacity (
U.S. General Accounting Office 1994a
,
U.S. General Accounting Office 1994b
;
Wiener and Stevenson 1997
). More research is needed to determine whether the waivers are truly cost effective in the sense of adding better value for the money spent. This would involve comparisons of waivers with institutional services that take into account functional and mental status, quality of care, quality of life, and other measures.
The major problem with increasing the HCBS program is the potential cost implications for the Medicaid program, unless waivers are designed to substitute directly for institutional care (
Snow 1996
;
Wiener 1996
;
U.S. General Accounting Office 1999
). Although some states already have extensive waiver programs, other states would have to expand their HCBS waiver programs, and that could result in greater costs (
Wiener 1996
). Policy makers are concerned about the potential for new applicants for HCBS services who refuse institutional care. On the other hand, the general growth in the aged and disabled population will continue to increase the demand for long-term-care services over time. Increasing HCBS services may require less capital and other investment to meet the future demand than would increasing institutional care. All of these considerations must be taken into account by state and federal policy makers in trying to shape Medicaid long-term-care services.
In summary, the growth of the aging and disabled populations is difficult to address, but new policies related to HCBS resources can be developed. A new focus on expanding federal and state resources for HCBS services, especially for states with low personal incomes, could encourage these states to expand their programs. At the same time, removing the regulatory barriers to the growth of home care services and increasing reimbursement rates for home care may encourage the growth of home care providers. Policies that control the growth of nursing homes and expand residential care and home care, along with policies that increase the Medicaid medically needy eligibility criteria appear to be the most likely means of expanding the Medicaid HCBS waiver programs in the states.
| Acknowledgments |
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Received for publication March 16, 2000. Accepted for publication June 30, 2000.
| Appendix ENDIX |
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2. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) (1981) of the Social Security Act for the Medicaid program (42 U.S.C. 1396 [n][c][1]) established the program. The regulations for the HCBS waiver program were established on October 1, 1981 (42 C.F.R. Parts 435, 436, 440, and 441; 46 Fed. Reg. 48541). The regulations were revised in 1985 (Final Rule - March 13, 1985) after changes were made in the Tax Equity and Federal Responsibility Act (TEFRA, 1984). The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA P.L. 99-272) added Section 9502 that permitted states to offer HCBS waivers for ventilator-dependent individuals who require a hospital level of care. In 1986 (OBRA P.L. 99509), Section 9411 was added to eliminate the requirement for ventilator-dependent and expanded the waiver authority to any individuals who would otherwise require Medicaid hospital care. The regulations were updated in 1994 (59 Fed. Reg. 37702, July 25, 1994) to take into account a number of legislative changes in COBRA of 1985, OBRA of 1986, and public comments to the proposed rule in 1988 (53 Fed. Reg. 19950). The rule also incorporated provisions from OBRA of 1987, MCCA of 1988, and OBRA of 1990 concerning home and community based services, and eliminated the requirements that states justify their request for specific numbers of waiver participants. This rule also eliminated the "cold beds" test which had required states to demonstrate that adequate institutional capacity would exist "absent the waiver."
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